Computer Security

is a branch of technology known as information security as applied to computers. The objective of computer security varies and can include protection of information from theft or corruption, or the preservation of availability, as defined in the security policy.

Computer security imposes requirements on computers that are different from most system requirements because they often take the form of constraints on what computers are not supposed to do. This makes computer security particularly challenging because we find it hard enough just to make computer programs just do everything they are designed to do correctly. Furthermore, negative requirements are deceptively complicated to satisfy and require exhaustive testing to verify, which is impractical for most computer programs. Computer security provides a technical strategy to convert negative requirements to positive enforceable rules. For this reason, computer security is often more technical and mathematical than some computer science fields.[citation needed]

Typical approaches to computer security (in approximate order of strength) can include the following:

* Physically limit access to computers to only those who will not compromise security.
* Hardware mechanisms that impose rules on computer programs, thus avoiding depending the computer programs for computer security.
* Operating system mechanisms that impose rules on programs to avoid trusting computer programs.
* Programming strategies to make computer programs dependable and resist subversion.
Secure operating systems

One use of the term computer security refers to technology to implement a secure operating system. Much of this technology is based on science developed in the 1980s and used to produce what may be some of the most impenetrable operating systems ever. Though still valid, the technology is almost inactive today, perhaps because it is complex or not widely understood. Such ultra-strong secure operating systems are based on operating system kernel technology that can guarantee that certain security policies are absolutely enforced in an operating environment. An example of such a Computer security policy is the Bell-LaPadula model. The strategy is based on a coupling of special microprocessor hardware features, often involving the memory management unit, to a special correctly implemented operating system kernel. This forms the foundation for a secure operating system which, if certain critical parts are designed and implemented correctly, can ensure the absolute impossibility of penetration by hostile elements. This capability is enabled because the configuration not only imposes a security policy, but in theory completely protects itself from corruption. Ordinary operating systems, on the other hand, lack the features that assure this maximal level of security. The design methodology to produce such secure systems is precise, deterministic and logical.

Systems designed with such methodology represent the state of the art of computer security and the capability to produce them is not widely known. In sharp contrast to most kinds of software, they meet specifications with verifiable certainty comparable to specifications for size, weight and power. Secure operating systems designed this way are used primarily to protect national security information and military secrets. These are very powerful security tools and very few secure operating systems have been certified at the highest level (Orange Book A-1) to operate over the range of "Top Secret" to "unclassified" (including Honeywell SCOMP, USAF SACDIN, NSA Blacker and Boeing MLS LAN.) The assurance of security depends not only on the soundness of the design strategy, but also on the assurance of correctness of the implementation, and therefore there are degrees of security strength defined for COMPUSEC. The Common Criteria quantifies security strength of products in terms of two components, security capability (as Protection Profile) and assurance levels (as EAL levels.) None of these ultra-high assurance secure general purpose operating systems have been produced for decades or certified under the Common Criteria.

[edit] Security architecture

Security Architecture can be defined as "The design artifacts that describe how the security controls (= security countermeasures) are positioned, and how they relate to the overall IT Architecture. These controls serve the purpose to maintain the system’s quality attributes, among them confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability and assurance."[1]. In simpler words, a security architecture is the plan that shows where security measures need to be placed. If the plan describes a specific solution then, prior to building such a plan, one would make a risk analysis. If the plan describes a generic high level design then (reference architecture) then the plan should be based on a threat analysis.

[edit] Security by design

The technologies of computer security are based on logic. There is no universal standard notion of what secure behavior is. "Security" is a concept that is unique to each situation. Security is extraneous to the function of a computer application, rather than ancillary to it, thus security necessarily imposes restrictions on the application's behavior.

There are several approaches to security in computing, sometimes a combination of approaches is valid:

1. Trust all the software to abide by a security policy but the software is not trustworthy (this is computer insecurity).
2. Trust all the software to abide by a security policy and the software is validated as trustworthy (by tedious branch and path analysis for example).
3. Trust no software but enforce a security policy with mechanisms that are not trustworthy (again this is computer insecurity).
4. Trust no software but enforce a security policy with trustworthy mechanisms.

Many systems have unintentionally resulted in the first possibility. Approaches one and three lead to failure. Since approach two is expensive and non-deterministic, its use is very limited. Because approach number four is often based on hardware mechanisms and avoid abstractions and a multiplicity of degrees of freedom, it is more practical. Combinations of approaches two and four are often used in a layered architecture with thin layers of two and thick layers of four.

There are myriad strategies and techniques used to design security systems. There are few, if any, effective strategies to enhance security after design.

One technique enforces the principle of least privilege to great extent, where an entity has only the privileges that are needed for its function. That way even if an attacker gains access to one part of the system, fine-grained security ensures that it is just as difficult for them to access the rest.

Furthermore, by breaking the system up into smaller components, the complexity of individual components is reduced, opening up the possibility of using techniques such as automated theorem proving to prove the correctness of crucial software subsystems. This enables a closed form solution to security that works well when only a single well-characterized property can be isolated as critical, and that property is also assessable to math. Not surprisingly, it is impractical for generalized correctness, which probably cannot even be defined, much less proven. Where formal correctness proofs are not possible, rigorous use of code review and unit testing represent a best-effort approach to make modules secure.

The design should use "defense in depth", where more than one subsystem needs to be violated to compromise the integrity of the system and the information it holds. Defense in depth works when the breaching of one security measure does not provide a platform to facilitate subverting another. Also, the cascading principle acknowledges that several low hurdles does not make a high hurdle. So cascading several weak mechanisms does not provide the safety of a single stronger mechanism.

Subsystems should default to secure settings, and wherever possible should be designed to "fail secure" rather than "fail insecure" (see fail safe for the equivalent in safety engineering). Ideally, a secure system should require a deliberate, conscious, knowledgeable and free decision on the part of legitimate authorities in order to make it insecure.

In addition, security should not be an all or nothing issue. The designers and operators of systems should assume that security breaches are inevitable. Full audit trails should be kept of system activity, so that when a security breach occurs, the mechanism and extent of the breach can be determined. Storing audit trails remotely, where they can only be appended to, can keep intruders from covering their tracks. Finally, full disclosure helps to ensure that when bugs are found the "window of vulnerability" is kept as short as possible.
Early history of security by design

The early Multics operating system was notable for its early emphasis on computer security by design, and Multics was possibly the very first operating system to be designed as a secure system from the ground up. In spite of this, Multics' security was broken, not once, but repeatedly. The strategy was known as 'penetrate and test' and has become widely known as a non-terminating process that fails to produce computer security. This led to further work on computer security that prefigured modern security engineering techniques producing closed form processes that terminate.

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Computer Insurance

When buying a computer it is normal practice to be offered insurance at the point of sale to protect your new purchase. It is now well known that personal computer retailers make a considerable additional profit from customers who believe they are being offered a cheap price. On average electrical retailers are known to charge their customers three to four times more than necessary.

Why Buy Computer Insurance?

Laptops and desktop computers are becoming an increasingly important commodity. For the opportunist thief, your computer is as good as ready money and it is one of the first things to go. This is all too common in business environments, public sector buildings, and now households as well. If you are a consultant who travels with a laptop to business meetings, there is a high risk of your laptop being stolen. Currently, 70,000 computers are stolen each year in the UK, and more than 100,000 are accidentally damaged.

Traditionally, house contents insurance would cover some additional items up to an upper value limit, the items being specified by the owner of the policy. In these circumstances if you have to make a claim, you may be penalised in a number of ways.

1. Many insurance companies' upper limits are not very high and would not cover the cost of a new computer. Unfortunately computers depreciate quickly and a computer that cost £2,000 when new, might not be worth more than £500 after only a year. Your contents policy would only pay the present value of the computer.
2. If you make a claim on your contents insurance, your total renewal premium will be significantly higher. This is because the premium is based on the entire contents of your house and not just the item you claimed for.
3. Many house contents policies will not provide cover if you remove the computer from your house or the office. If you use a laptop and travel to business meetings you are taking an unnecessary risk.

Key Features of Computer Insurance:

• 'All Risks' cover worldwide.
• No excess.
• Rapid claims response, with authorisation guaranteed in ordinary circumstances, within 24 hours or less.
• No additional security arrangements required.
• Simple premium calculation based on the value of your equipment.
• All hardware including printers and scanners also covered.
• Minimal exclusions.

What is not Covered by Computer Insurance?

As with all technical equipment, computer insurance does not provide cover for items such as:

• Maintenance costs.
• Electrical or mechanical failure.
• Wear and tear.
• Fraud and dishonesty.
• Consequential loss. Loss or damage caused by sonic bangs is not covered but may be covered under any warranty/extended warranty you may have.